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INTRODUCTION
On June 22, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (the “Act”), which
banned the sale of all flavored cigarettes except for menthol.1 On
July 20, 2010, Indonesia requested the establishment of a Panel of
the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) Dispute Settlement Body
(“DSB”)2 to determine if the ban is “inconsistent with various U.S.
obligations” as a member of the WTO.3 Indonesia, the largest
1. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31,
123 Stat. 1776 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); see Jeff Zeleny,
Occasional Smoker, 47, Signs Tobacco Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at A15
(describing President Obama’s statements that the new law is an important step in
youth smoking prevention).
2. See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS406: United States – Measures
Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept.
21, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/Tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds406_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Dispute DS406] (explaining that on September
9, 2010, the parties agreed to the formal composition of the Panel).
3. See Request for Consultations by Indonesia, United States – Measures
Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 5, WT/DS406/1 (Apr. 14,
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exporter of clove cigarettes to the United States (“U.S.”) before the
ban,4 argues that the Act discriminates against Indonesian-produced
clove cigarettes, thereby violating Article III of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). Indonesia further argues
that GATT Article XX, which enumerates exceptions for trade
distorting behavior in certain circumstances, does not provide the
United States with a valid public health justification for the ban.5
This Note argues that the U.S. ban on clove cigarettes is
inconsistent with WTO member obligations arising from current
interpretations of GATT Articles III and XX. Part II provides
background on the law that mandates the ban, GATT Articles III and
XX, and the content of the Indonesian complaint. Part III analyzes
the Indonesian complaint and argues that menthol and clove
cigarettes are “like products” under GATT Article III:4 and that the
United States unfairly discriminates against clove cigarettes. Part III
also contends that GATT Article XX(b) does not provide the United
States with a reasonable justification for the ban on public health
grounds. Part IV offers legislative recommendations for Congress to
modify the Act to bring the United States into conformity with its
WTO obligations.

I. LEGAL BACKGROUND ON AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE
A. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND ON THE U.S. STATUTORY BAN OF
FLAVORED CIGARETTES
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act gives
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) broad new statutory
authority to regulate tobacco products under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).6 Specifically, section 101 of the Act
2010) [hereinafter U.S. – Clove Cigarettes] (setting forth Indonesia’s allegations
that the United States is violating specific WTO agreements, including Articles III
and XX of GATT).
4. See, e.g., Press Release, World Trade Org. [WTO], U.S. Blocks Indonesian
Request for Panel on Clove Cigarettes (June 22, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. Blocks
Indonesian Request], available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/
dsb_22jun10_e.htm (noting that before the ban Indonesia exported ninety-nine
percent of clove cigarettes consumed in the United States).
5. See id.; U.S. – Clove Cigarettes, supra note 3, ¶ 5(b).
6. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 101(b);
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adds chapter IX, section 907(a)(1)(A) to the FDCA, which bans the
sale of cigarettes that contain an herb or spice that is a
“characterizing flavor of the tobacco product.”7 Importantly, section
907(a)(1)(A) exempts menthol cigarettes from the ban.8 Advocates
for the ban contend that flavored cigarettes appeal primarily to
children and encourage them to start smoking.9 The Act does not
exempt menthol cigarettes from any new regulations, but section
907(e) requires the creation of a Scientific Advisory Committee to
issue a report on the impact of menthol cigarettes on public health.10

B. GATT PROVISIONS RELEVANT TO THE DISPUTE: ARTICLE III:4
AND ARTICLE XX(B)
The GATT seeks to “[reduce] tariffs and other barriers to trade
and [eliminate] discriminatory treatment in international
commerce.”11 GATT Article III prohibits WTO members from
imposing taxes (Article III:2) or other regulations (Article III:4) that
treat imports, after passage through customs, “less favorably” than
domestic like products.12 This Article embodies the important
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2006 & Supp.
2010). In 1996, the FDA claimed the authority to regulate cigarettes, but was
subsequently restricted from doing so in the 2000 Supreme Court Decision, FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. See 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000) (concluding
that Congress did not intend to allow the FDA to regulate tobacco products). The
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act gives the FDA this
regulatory authority under the FDCA. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act, § 101(b)(3). See generally C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & VANESSA K.
BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40196, FDA TOBACCO REGULATION:
HISTORY OF THE 1996 RULE AND RELATED LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY, 1998-2008
(2009) (surveying federal regulation of cigarettes from 1996 through 2009).
7. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, §§ 101(b),
907(a)(1)(A); see also FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF: GENERAL
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE BAN OF CIGARETTES THAT CONTAIN CERTAIN
CHARACTERIZING FLAVORS 1, 4 (2d ed. 2009) (outlining the FDA’s stance on the
scope of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act).
8. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907(a)(1)(A).
9. E.g., Press Release, FDA, Candy and Fruit Flavored Cigarettes Now Illegal
in United States; Step is First Under New Tobacco Law (Sept. 22, 2009), available
at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2009/ucm
183211.htm.
10. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907(e).
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A–
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
12. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. III:1, (2), (4), Apr.
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principle of national treatment, which holds that all goods and
services, regardless of origin, must be treated equally after they enter
into a domestic market.13 Article III:4 applies the national treatment
principle explicitly to a nation’s enforcement of laws, regulations,
and other requirements.14
GATT Article XX enumerates certain “general exceptions” that
allow members to violate GATT rules if necessary to pursue
legitimate domestic policies.15 These exceptions exist because the
WTO recognizes that members must pursue important policies other
than free trade.16 Article XX(b) allows nations to pursue WTO15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 190 [hereinafter GATT] (“The contracting parties
recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and
requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the
mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should
not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to
domestic production.”); see also Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, 16, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct.
1, 1996) [hereinafter Japan – Alcohol] (noting that the “after customs” language in
Article III:1 was intended to prevent indirect protectionism); Appellate Body
Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, ¶ 99, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC –
Asbestos] (noting that like product under Article III:4 is broader than under Article
III:2).
13. See WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 10-11 (2010), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf
(describing national treatment as a way to prevent discrimination against foreign
products, services, or nationals).
14. See GATT, supra note 12, art. III:4 (“The products of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The
provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of
the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.”); Japan –
Alcohol, supra note 12, at 14 (calling the prevention of protectionist measures the
“broad and fundamental purpose” of Article III).
15. GATT, supra note 12, art. XX; see also Appellate Body Report, United
States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 121,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. – Shrimp] (stating that the
enumerated exceptions in GATT Article XX are recognized as embodying
domestic policies that are ”important and legitimate in character”).
16. See BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND 339 (2d ed.
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inconsistent measures if they are “necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant health.”17 Should a member pursue a policy that falls
under the scope of Article XX, it does not have to preemptively
defend the policy unless challenged by another member through the
GATT’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism.18 The burden of proof falls
on the member invoking the Article XX exception.19

C. INDONESIA’S WTO COMPLAINT
Indonesian diplomats argue that banning clove cigarettes, while
continuing to allow the sale of menthol cigarettes, would
discriminate against Indonesian products and therefore violate the
U.S. obligation to avoid nondiscriminatory trading practices as a
member of the WTO.20 Indonesia believes that the Act discriminates
against clove cigarettes because clove cigarettes sold in the United
States before the ban were imported primarily from Indonesia,
whereas virtually all menthol cigarettes sold in the United States are
produced domestically.21 On April 7, 2010, the Indonesian delegation
2001) (recognizing that certain non-economic objectives are vital to countries’
public policies).
17. GATT, supra note 12, art. XX(b).
18. See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 16, at 339 (explaining that the lack
of a notification requirement means that the affected party must initiate the dispute
if it believes the challenged policy does not fall under an Article XX exception).
19. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, 20-21, WT/DS2/9 (May 20, 1996) [hereinafter U.S. –
Gasoline] (placing the burden of proof on the United States to show, as the party
invoking the exception, that the discrimination against imported gasoline was
justified under Article XX when challenged under the Dispute Settlement
Mechanism).
20. See 155 CONG. REC. E912, E913-14 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2009) (statement of
Rep. Virginia Foxx) (introducing into the Congressional Record letters from
Indonesian Ambassador Parnohadiningrat to the Chairman of the House Energy
and Commerce Committee Henry Waxman on July 25, 2008, and from the
Indonesian Minister of Trade, Mari Elka Pangestu, to former Ambassador Schwab
on August 28, 2007, both of which raised concerns about a ban on flavored
cigarettes).
21. See U.S. Blocks Indonesian Request, supra note 4 (referencing data
provided by Indonesia that it produces ninety-nine percent of clove cigarettes sold
in the United States); see also US blocks Indonesian request for panel on clove
cigarettes (June 22, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/dsb_22
jun10_e.htm (reporting that over ninety-nine percent of clove cigarettes sold in the
U.S. were produced in Indonesia, and that more than six million Indonesian jobs
have been affected by the U.S. ban on clove cigarettes); Arti Ekawati & Faisal
Maliki Baskoro, Clove Tobacco Industry Faces Dual Challenges, JAKARTA GLOBE
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initiated the WTO’s Dispute Resolution Process by circulating a
Request for Consultations with the United States.22 Indonesia alleges
that section 907 of the Act violates GATT Article III:4.23 Indonesia
maintains that because clove and menthol cigarettes are “like
products,” and because the ban applies to clove cigarettes, but not to
menthol cigarettes, it violates the nondiscrimination clause of Article
III:4.24 Furthermore, Indonesia contends that Article XX(b), which
allows for limited exceptions to discriminatory trade policies if they
are necessary to protect human health, does not apply because the
Act “unjustifiably” and “arbitrarily” discriminates against the
Indonesian product.25 The United States rejects Indonesia’s
arguments.26

(June 22, 2010), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/business/ clove-tobaccoindustry-faces-dual-challenges/382003 (adding to the mounting pressure against
clove cigarettes, the World Health Organization has proposed a ban on all flavored
cigarettes in its Framework Convention on Tobacco Control).
22. U.S. – Clove Cigarettes, supra note 3, ¶¶ 1-2. See generally Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 2, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401. The WTO Dispute Resolution Process is administered by the
Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”). Id. Should Consultations between members
involved in the dispute fail, a Dispute Resolution Panel will be formed and will
rule on the dispute. Id. art. 4 ¶ 7. Any party to the dispute can appeal the judgment
of the Panel to the Appellate Body, which may “uphold, modify, or reverse” the
Panel’s findings. Id. art. 17, ¶¶ 4, 13. After the Appellate Body releases its report,
the member who is found to have violated its obligations must state its intention to
bring its trade practices into conformity with its WTO obligations. Id. art. 21, ¶ 3.
23. Dispute DS406, supra note 2, ¶ 5(a).
24. Id.
25. See id. ¶¶ 2-5 (outlining Indonesia’s allegations that section 907 of the
FDCA, in addition to violating GATT, also violates other WTO provisions,
including the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT”) and the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS”)).
SPS sets allowable constraints regarding food safety and sets standards for animal
and plant health. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. TBT insures that technical standards
do not result in unnecessary barriers to trade. Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
26. See U.S. Blocks Indonesian Request, supra note 4 (stating the U.S. position
that Indonesia’s WTO complaint is premature, given the ongoing FDA
investigation of flavored cigarettes).
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II. ANALYSIS
A. THE U.S. BAN ON CLOVE CIGARETTES IS INCONSISTENT WITH
OBLIGATIONS ARISING UNDER GATT ARTICLE III:4 BECAUSE
CLOVE CIGARETTES AND MENTHOL CIGARETTES ARE “LIKE
PRODUCTS” AND THE BAN DISCRIMINATES AGAINST CLOVE
CIGARETTES.
GATT Article III:4 prohibits WTO members from passing laws,
regulations, or other requirements that treat an imported product less
favorably than a “like” domestically-produced product after it passes
through customs.27 Section 907 of the FDCA violates Article III:4
because clove cigarettes and menthol cigarettes are “like products”
and the Act discriminates against foreign-produced clove cigarettes
by allowing the sale of menthol cigarettes. This conclusion is based
on an Appellate Body determination in EC – Asbestos that broadly
interpreted “like products” to refer to products that are in a
competitive relationship.28
After analyzing the competitive relationship between clove and
menthol cigarettes, the Dispute Resolution Panel should conclude
that imported clove cigarettes and domestically produced menthol
cigarettes are “like products” under Article III:4.29 Consequently, the
Panel should determine that the treatment of these “like products” is
discriminatory under GATT because the United States provides
clove cigarettes with drastically unequal competitive opportunities
compared to the opportunities afforded to menthol cigarettes.30
27. GATT, supra note 12, art. III:4; see also Japan – Alcohol, supra note 12, at
15-16 (emphasizing that members can still tax or regulate items to further domestic
agendas as long as such taxation or regulation does not violate Article III or any
other WTO agreement and that the “after customs” interpretation is aimed at
preventing indirect protectionism).
28. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶¶ 99-100 (acknowledging that the
Appellate Body’s interpretation of “like products” gives the “provision a relatively
broad product scope”).
29. See GATT, supra note 12, art. III:4; EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶¶ 9799 (mandating that the term “like product” in Article III:4 be interpreted in light of
the “general principle” of Article III to avoid protectionism and “ensure ‘equality
of competitive conditions’”).
30. See Panel Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 6.10, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Panel
Report, U.S. – Gasoline] (affirming that “less favorable treatment” is interpreted to
mean whether a product is afforded unequal competitive opportunities than a
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1. Domestically Produced Menthol Cigarettes and Imported Clove
Cigarettes Are “Like Products” Under Article III:4 Because They
Are in a Competitive Relationship
In determining whether products are in a competitive relationship,
the Appellate Body endorsed a four-prong analysis created by a 1970
GATT Working Party Report on Border Taxes, which noted that the
analysis was neither mandatory authority from a treaty nor a “closed
list of criteria that will determine the legal characterization of
products.”31 This framework includes an analysis of: (1) the
products’ physical properties; (2) the extent to which the products are
capable of serving the same end-use; (3) consumers’ perceptions and
behavior towards the products; and (4) the products’ international
classification for tariff purposes.32 Further, the Appellate Body
cautioned that this list was to be used merely as a tool to examine
relevant evidence and stressed the need to examine “all . . . pertinent
evidence.”33 The Panel, utilizing this four-prong framework and
examining all relevant evidence, should conclude that clove and
menthol cigarettes are “like products.”34
“like” domestically-produced product). The Panel found that the U.S. treated
imported gasoline less favorably than domestic gasoline under Article III:4
because government regulations forced certain importers to import gasoline at a
lower price, which meant that importers had to “make cost and price allowances”
because they had to import other types of gasoline to comply with the U.S.
regulations. Id.
31. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶¶ 101-02; GATT General Counsel,
Report by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 18, L/3464 (Nov. 20,
1970) [hereinafter Working Party Report]; see also Robert E. Hudec, “Like
Product”: The Difference in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III, in REGULATORY
BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW
101, 101 (Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000) (distinguishing
between the notion that the meaning of “like product” varies depending on the
policies behind the GATT provision at issue and the idea that “like product”
cannot be “reduced to definable criteria”).
32. EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 101; see, e.g., Panel Report, Brazil –
Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 7.415, WT/DS332/R (June 12,
2007) (showing that the Panel considers “physical characteristics, . . . end use, . . .
tariff headings, . . . and evidence of any difference in consumers' perceptions and
behavior” in a like product analysis).
33. EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 102.
34. See id, ¶¶ 101-103 (noting that although the criteria of the Working Party
provides a framework for analyzing “like product” questions, this does not
“dissolve the duty or the need to examine, in each case, all of the pertinent
evidence”).
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First, the “properties, nature and quality” of menthol and clove
cigarettes are very similar.35 That is, both are cigarettes comprised
primarily of tobacco.36 Though clove cigarettes are made from a
mixture of tobacco and approximately 30% to 40% minced cloves,37
menthol cigarettes generally contain between 0.1% and 1.0% “of
their tobacco weight in menthol.”38 While it is evident that the
percentage composition of the flavoring ingredient is much greater in
clove cigarettes than in menthol cigarettes, the Appellate Body stated
that an analysis of physical properties must be examined in the
context of how those properties influence the “competitive
relationship between products in the marketplace.”39 The use of both
clove and menthol serve as masking agents that mute the harshness
of regular cigarettes.40 The Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos
35. See id. ¶ 120 (clarifying that the physical properties of the products being
compared for likeness are important but must be analyzed in the context of all
relevant evidence).
36. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1332
(2006) (defining cigarette as “(A) any roll of tobacco wrapped in paper or in any
substance not containing tobacco, and (B) any roll of tobacco wrapped in any
substance containing tobacco which, because of its appearance, the type of tobacco
in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is likely to offered to, or purchased by,
consumers as a cigarette described in subparagraph (A)”). Menthol and clove
cigarettes, regardless of dimensions, fit this definition. Menthol and Clove
cigarettes also fit the physical description of cigarettes as defined by common
dictionaries. See, e.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 406
(1993) (defining cigarette as “a tube of finely cut tobacco enclosed in paper,
designed for smoking and [usually] narrower and shorter than a cigar”). See also
C. L. Gaworski et al., Toxicologic Evaluation of Flavor Ingredients Added to
Cigarette Tobacco: 13–week Inhalation Exposures in Rats, 10 INHALATION
TOXICOLOGY 357, 360 (1998) (describing the typical composition of cigarettes).
37. See Tee L. Guidotti et al., Clove Cigarettes: The Basis for Concern
Regarding Health Effects, 151 W. J. MED. 220, 221 (1989) (describing the
chemical composition of clove cigarettes and remarking that clove cigarettes have
a higher tar content then “most domestic American brands”).
38. See Jennifer M. Kreslake et al., Tobacco Industry Control of Menthol in
Cigarettes and Targeting of Adolescents and Young Adults, 98 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1685, 1685 (2008) (describing the properties and effects of the menthol in
menthol cigarettes as a “monocyclic terpene alcohol that acts as a stimulant for
cold receptors” which gives menthol cigarettes a “cooling sensation and mintlike
flavor” when smoked).
39. EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 114.
40. See id. at 1685; Guidotti et al., supra note 37, at 221-22; cf. Bhimrao K.
Jadhav et al., Formulation and Evaluation of Mucoadhesive Tablets Containing
Eugenol for the Treatment of Periodontal Diseases, 30 DRUG DEV. & INDUS.
PHARMACY 195, 196 (2004) (describing the physiological effects of Eugenol, the
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considered toxicity to be a factor in determining products’ physical
properties.41 However, this consideration included other factors, such
as consumer preference for, or aversion to, such toxicity.42 Here,
because both clove and menthol cigarettes are known to be
carcinogens,43 the presence of toxicity should not be considered an
influencing factor as in EC - Asbestos.44 Additionally, toxicity should
also be excluded from the Panel’s likeness determination because
both menthol and clove cigarettes are tobacco delivery systems
which are federally mandated to carry health warnings regarding the
dangers of their toxicity.45
The United States may have a valid argument that the percentage
composition of the constituent ingredients of these two types of
cigarettes is sufficiently different so as to result in dissimilar levels
of toxicity.46 This claim, however, is weakened by evidence
suggesting that other additive-flavored cigarettes banned under the
FDCA have a similar composition and level of toxicity as that found
in menthol cigarettes.47 Considering that the U.S. ban extends to
chemical found in clove, and its use as an anesthetic for dentistry procedures).
41. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 122 (finding that evidence related to
consumer demand was relevant to determining whether health risks were posed by
chrysotile asbestos and PCG fibers because “[i]f the risks posed by a [product] are
sufficiently great, the [consumer] may simply cease to buy the product”).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH
PROMOTION, OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 3-8 (2004) [hereinafter Office on
Smoking and Health Report] (identifying multiple forms of cancer linked to
smoking and stating that every report the U.S. Surgeon General has issued found
that smoking causes many diseases and harmful health effects).
44. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶¶ 122-24 (finding that evidence of
consumer demand is particularly relevant to “like product” determinations when
toxicity is present in one product but lacking in another).
45. See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 1333
(2006) (mandating that cigarette manufacturers place stringent warnings on packs
of cigarettes, regardless of flavor or inclusion of additives).
46. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 114 (identifying toxicity as a
fundamental physical property of chrysotile asbestos fibers, but not of PCG fibers,
and concluding that the varying levels of toxicity between the two types of fibers
must be a major factor in the Panel’s likeness determination).
47. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907 (banning
cigarettes containing additives, artificial flavors, and herbs and spices); Report of
the Panel, Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, ¶ 42, 63-89, DS10/R – 37S/200 (Nov. 7, 1990) [hereinafter Thailand –
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other flavored cigarettes with similar percentages of flavor additives
as menthol cigarettes, this argument is unconvincing.48 Therefore,
even after consideration of the U.S. counter-argument, the first prong
of the test is met.
Second, clove and menthol cigarettes perform the same end-use
because they are both “nicotine delivery devices” for human
beings.49 The Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos defined end-use as
“capable of performing the same, or similar, functions.”50 Cigarette
manufacturers use additives, such as clove or menthol, to enhance
nicotine delivery by making the act of smoking more palatable for
smokers.51 Because menthol cigarettes and clove cigarettes share this
end-use, a Panel should find this prong met.52

Cigarettes] (restating the U.S. argument that all manufactured cigarettes, even
though they may have varying tobacco mixtures, are nonetheless “like products”).
The Panel did not rule on this specific U.S. claim.
48. Cf. E.L Carmines, Evaluation of the Potential Effects of Ingredients Added
to Cigarettes. Part 1: Cigarette Design, Testing Approach, and Review of Results,
40 FOOD & CHEMICAL TOXICOLOGY 77, 79-85 (2002) (describing the amount of
flavoring ingredients involved in the manufacture of commercial cigarettes and
showing that menthol, cocoa, and licorice all have similar concentrations). See
Gaworski et al., supra note 36, at 360-62 (displaying that in a test comparing other
flavor additives with menthol, where flavored cigarette additives were analyzed in
the amount typically used in the manufacturing process, cocoa powder had a
higher concentration and vanilla extract had a much lower concentration per
cigarette).
49. Cf. Kreslake et al., supra note 38, at 1689 (stating that additive ingredients
in cigarettes affect the “uptake” of the active drugs in cigarettes).
50. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 117 (establishing that end-use of a
product is linked explicitly to whether the products are in a competitive
relationship).
51. See J. S. WIGAND, ADDITIVES, CIGARETTE DESIGN AND TOBACCO PRODUCT
REGULATION TBD (2006), available at http://www.jeffreywigand.com/
WHOFinal.pdf (listing the physiological effects of additives in cigarettes,
including the amelioration of the effects of smoking by “making it more palatable
either through the use of sweeteners or chemical agents that negate the normal
airway aversion to smoke or have pharmacological action”).
52. Compare Kreslake, supra note 38, at 1689 (showing that scientific
evidence supports the proposition that menthol cigarettes and clove cigarettes share
the same end-use because they both have ingredients that affect the user’s uptake
of the smoke produced by the product), with EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 144
(positing that the Appellate Body could not conclusively determine whether
products containing asbestos fibers could fulfill all the same end-uses as products
without asbestos fibers and therefore could not determine whether the two products
generally fulfilled the same end-use).
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Third, consumers use clove and menthol cigarettes for the same
purpose: to fulfill a desire to smoke a tobacco product.53 The
Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos stated that evidence regarding the
extent to which consumers chose one product over another is “highly
relevant evidence in assessing the ‘likeness’ of those products under
Article III:4.”54 Consumers’ tastes and habits clearly show that they
buy cigarettes, regardless of flavor, to fulfill a pharmacological,
social, or personal need.55 The fact that menthol cigarettes have a
much larger market share is not directly relevant under the EC –
Asbestos interpretation, which instead focuses on consumers’ ability
to choose between the products.56 Before the ban, consumers were
able to exercise a choice; now they cannot.57
Finally, the tariff classifications of menthol and clove cigarettes
are very comparable.58 Though the EC - Asbestos Appellate Body
Report downplayed the importance of the tariff classification factor
in determining whether products are like, it is still a relevant element
in the “like product” analysis.59 According to the U.S. International
Trade Commission’s Harmonized Tariff Schedule, all cigarette

53. See Martin J. Jarvis, ABC of Smoking Cessation: Why People Smoke, 328
BRIT. MED. J. 277, 277 (2004) (recognizing that “smoking is primarily a
manifestation of nicotine addiction” but also that people smoke cigarettes for a
number of reasons besides their pharmacological effects, including personal,
social, economic, and political reasons).
54. EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 117.
55. See Jarvis, supra note 53, at 277 (averring that “[s]ocial, economic,
personal, and political influences [help] determin[e] patterns of smoking”);
Kreslake, supra note 38, at 1685 (stating that the cigarette industry constantly
“develops product innovations to encourage experimentation and use” among
smokers).
56. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 117 (finding that if there is no
competitive relationship between two products, then there is no way to
comparatively measure consumers’ taste and habits with regard to those products).
57. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907 (banning
the sale of all flavored cigarettes except for menthol cigarettes).
58. See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States, ch. 24-12 (2010), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/
docs/tata/hts/bychapter/1000htsa.pdf [hereinafter Harmonized Tariff Schedule]
(showing that all cigarettes, including clove and menthol cigarettes, share the same
tariff heading).
59. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 140 (finding that the divergent tariff
headings for chrysotile asbestos fibers and PCG fibers tended to indicate that the
products were not “like products” under Article III:4).
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tariffs are located under the heading 2402.20.60 For international
tariff purposes, clove cigarettes and menthol cigarettes are treated
identically, and thus the fourth prong is unequivocally met.61
Application of the four-pronged EC – Asbestos analysis therefore
reveals that menthol and clove cigarettes are “like products” because
they share the same end-use, have an identical tariff classification,
are physically similar, and are employed by consumers to fill an
analogous need.62
2. The Ban on Clove Cigarettes is Discriminatory Under Article III:4
Because the Competitive Opportunities for Clove Cigarettes are Less
than Those for Menthol Cigarettes.
After finding that clove and menthol cigarettes are “like products,”
the Panel should conclude that the United States gives imported
clove cigarettes less favorable treatment than domestically produced
menthol cigarettes.63 In U.S. – Gasoline the Panel determined that
less favorable treatment exists where an imported product has fewer
equal competitive opportunities than a domestically produced
product.64
60. See Harmonized Tariff Schedule, supra note 58, at 24-12 (showing that
cigarettes containing tobacco generally have the tariff heading 2402.20, and that
clove cigarettes are a subset of cigarettes containing tobacco and have the subheading 2402.20.10); see generally Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Tariff
Schedules: Harmonized System and World Customs Organization,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/industry-manufacturing/industrial-tariffs/tariffschedules (explaining that the U.S.’ harmonized tariff schedule is based on the
classification scheme created by the International Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding System (“HS”) administered by the World Customs
Organization, which sets the global standard tariff classification system). This
tariff system is used by over 200 countries and economies around the world and
more than ninety-eight percent of goods traded internationally are categorized by
the HS. Id.
61. Harmonized Tariff Schedule, supra note 58.
62. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 101 (outlining the four-pronged test).
63. See GATT, supra note 12, art. III:4 (providing that imported products
“shall be accorded treatment no less favourable” than like domestic products).
64. See Panel Report, U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 30, ¶ 6.10 (finding, inter
alia, that U.S. standards for gasoline cleanliness were more burdensome for
imported gasoline than domestically produced gasoline, making imported gasoline
more expensive); see also Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting
Import of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef, ¶ 139, WT/DS161/AB/R,
WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea – Beef] (finding that Korea
violated Article III:4 by requiring that imported beef be sold separately from
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In the present case, the Panel will have little trouble determining
that the Act treats menthol cigarettes more favorably than it does
clove cigarettes. The Indonesian complaint is analogous to U.S. –
Gasoline because the competitive conditions surrounding menthol
cigarettes are much more favorable than the conditions afforded to
clove cigarettes; FDCA allows the former to be sold in the United
States but bans the latter.65 Therefore, because menthol and clove
cigarettes are “like products,” and because the United States affords
clove cigarettes less favorable treatment than menthol cigarettes, the
Panel should find that the U.S. ban is a discriminatory trade practice
under current interpretation of Article III:4.

B. THE PUBLIC HEALTH EXCEPTION OF ARTICLE XX(B) DOES NOT
APPLY BECAUSE THE BAN ON CLOVE CIGARETTES IS NOT
NECESSARY AND IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE BINDING GOAL OF
THE ARTICLE’S CHAPEAU.
The ban cannot be justified as an exception under Article XX(b).66
An Article XX(b) exception will be valid only if a member country
establishes three elements: (1) the policy in question protects human,
animal, or plant life or health; (2) the policy is necessary to reach the
policy objective; and (3) the measures meet the requirements of the
introduction, or chapeau, of Article XX.67 While the United States
domestic beef). In Korea – Beef, the government mandated “dual-retail system” for
sales of beef was less favorable to imported beef products because 1) consumers
were hindered from comparing the products; 2) retailers had to substitute imported
beef for all domestic beef; 3) market-opportunities for imported beef were
curtailed; and 4) consumers were led to believe that imported and domestic beef
were different even though they were “like products” under Article III:4. Id.
65. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907; Panel
Report, U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 30, ¶ 6.10 (noting that an Article III:4
violation occurs when competitive conditions are different between domestic and
imported products).
66. See GATT, supra note 12, art. XX(b) (exempting measures “necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health”); cf. EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶¶
162-163, 192 (finding that asbestos was a health risk and holding that its adverse
treatment was appropriate under the Article XX(b) exception).
67. See GATT, supra note 12, art. XX (“Subject to the requirement that such
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party
of measures [falling within one of the expressly provided exceptions].”); see also

530

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[26:2

can prove that its policy is designed to protect human health, it
cannot prove that the ban is necessary or that it conforms to the
binding goal of the chapeau of Article XX.68
1. The Ban on Clove Cigarettes Is a Policy Designed to Protect
Human Life and the Health of American Children.
The United States will likely argue that the ban is defensible under
an XX(b) exemption because the ban on flavored cigarettes protects
U.S. children from the harms of smoking cigarettes.69 To determine
whether a policy’s purpose is to protect human health, the Panel
generally considers the design and structure of the policy.70 The
United States can offer data on the dangers of child smoking71 to
Panel Report, U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 30, ¶ 6.20 (noting that the party that
invokes the exception has the burden of proof for demonstrating that the
inconsistent measure is within the scope of Article XX exceptions). Though the
U.S. – Gasoline dispute was not reviewed by the Appellate Body, the Panel also
used this test in EC – Asbestos and European Communities – Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries. See Panel Report,
European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, ¶ 8.184, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter EC – Asbestos Panel
Report] (using the U.S. – Gasoline test to determine if the ban on asbestoscontaining products fit within an Article XX(b) exception); Panel Report,
European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, ¶¶ 7.198–7.199, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter
EC – Tariff Preferences] (employing the U.S. – Gasoline test to determine whether
arrangements to combat drug production and trafficking in developing countries
were justified under Article XX(b)).
68. GATT, supra note 12, art. XX.
69. See, e.g., World Health Org. (“WHO”), The Scientific Basis of Tobacco
Product Regulation, at 36-37, No. 945 (2007), http://www.who.int/tobacco/global
_interaction/tobreg/9789241209458.pdf (indicating that flavored cigarettes tend to
target youths by “promoting youth initiation and helping young occasional
smokers to become daily smokers by reducing or masking the natural harshness
and taste of tobacco smoke”); see also discussion infra Part III(B)(2) (noting that
the upcoming 2011 scientific study, required by the Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act, will investigate the effects of menthol cigarettes and
report its findings by March 2011).
70. See EC — Tariff Preferences, supra note 67, ¶¶ 7.201-202, 7.207 (finding
that the policy behind the EC’s Drug Arrangements, which granted certain tariff
preferences, was designed to fulfill sustainable development and poverty
objectives and not to protect human health).
71. See OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH REPORT, supra note 43, at 3
(outlining the “diseases and other adverse health effects” linked to smoking); 29
Surgeon General’s Reports on Smoking and Health, 1964–2006, U.S. OFFICE OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL (2006), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/second

2011]

LOSING FLAVOR

531

prove that the ban on clove cigarettes protects children from the
dangers of smoking.
The present case is factually analogous to Thailand – Cigarettes,
where the Panel, using an older Article XX(b) analysis that stressed
whether other alternative measures were reasonably available, found
that smoking was a risk to human health and that policies designed to
reduce the number of smokers fell within the scope of Article
XX(b).72 The Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos found that asbestoscontaining products were scientifically shown to cause human
harm.73 Here, the U.S. Congress passed a law with a designed intent
similar to the questioned policy in Thailand - Cigarettes: reducing
the number of children who smoke cigarettes.74 By banning the sale
of flavored cigarettes, Congress sought to remove an opportunity for
children to become regular, daily smokers and to reduce the risk of
tobacco-related disease.75 The Panel will have no difficulty finding
that Indonesian-produced clove cigarettes pose a health risk to U.S.
children, and therefore, the United States will fulfill the first element
required for an Article XX(b) exception.76
handsmoke/factsheets/factsheet8.html (summarizing the findings of the twentynine U.S. Surgeon General reports that found adverse health consequences related
to smoking cigarettes).
72. See Thailand – Cigarettes, supra note 47, ¶¶ 73-74 (explaining that the
meaning of “necessary” under Article XX(b) is the same as that under Article
XX(d)); see also Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, §§ 2(14),
(30)-(31) (elucidating Congressional findings that reducing the number of children
who smoke is a goal of the legislation).
73. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 157 (finding that asbestos-containing
products cause certain human illnesses).
74. Compare Thailand – Cigarettes, supra note 47, ¶ 38 (noting that the goal of
the Thai policy was to reduce the harm to the public caused by cigarettes), with
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act §§ 2(1)-(7), (13)-(14)
(stating that tobacco regulation is in the U.S.’ public interest and expressing
concern with the adverse health consequences associated with smoking,
particularly those that affect youth smokers).
75. See Enforcement of General Tobacco Standard Special Rule for Cigarettes,
74 Fed. Reg. 48974 (FDA Sept. 25, 2009) (notice) [hereinafter FDA Notice]
(explaining that from Congress’ perspective, “[t]he removal from the market of
cigarettes that contain certain characterizing flavors is an important step in the
FDA’s efforts to reduce the burden of illness and death caused by tobacco
products” because flavored cigarettes appeal to children and make it more likely
that youth smokers will become addicted to smoking).
76. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 175 (clarifying that if a Panel
recognizes a credible health risk, then the member has established a prima facie

532

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[26:2

2. The Ban on Clove Cigarettes Is Unnecessary Because the United
States Can Pursue Other Nondiscriminatory Policy Measures That
Accomplish Its Public Health Objectives.
Though the ban on clove cigarettes prevents children from
smoking clove cigarettes, the policy by which the goal is achieved
fails the Article XX(b) “necessary” requirement.77 For a measure to
be necessary, the Appellate Body requires that the measure be close
to “indispensible” to protect human health.78 The Appellate Body in
Brazil – Tyres reaffirmed an established balancing test in evaluating
whether a policy is “necessary”: the trade restricting elements of the
questioned policy are weighed against the degree to which it protects
human, plant, or animal health.79 Furthermore, a member’s policy is
necessary only if no other alternative would satisfy the policy’s goals
while remaining consistent with its obligations under GATT.80
The United States faces a difficult task in proving the nonexistence
of other, less intrusive means to achieve the policy’s goal that do not
discriminate against foreign products and are consistent with
GATT.81 The Appellate Body addressed a similar problem in EC –
case for an Article XX(b) exception).
77. See EC - Tariff Preferences, supra note 67, ¶¶ 7.197(2), 7.211–7.213
(stating that to invoke an Article XX(b) exception, a party must show that the
“inconsistent measures for which the exception was being invoked were
necessary” to fulfill the policy objective)(emphasis omitted).
78. See id. ¶ 7.211 (describing a continuum of policies that could be considered
necessary, and opining that the policy should be closer to “‘indispensible’” in
protecting human health, rather than merely “making a ‘contribution to’”
protecting human health).
79. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of
Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 24, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil –
Tyres] (“Weighing and balancing involves, first, an individual assessment of each
element (importance of the objective pursued; trade restrictiveness of the measure;
contribution of the measure to the achievement of the objective) and, then, a
consideration of the role and relative importance of each element together with the
other elements, for the purposes of deciding whether the challenged measure is
necessary to achieve the relevant objective.”).
80. See Thailand – Cigarettes, supra note 47, ¶¶ 74-75 (finding that Thailand’s
restrictions on cigarette imports would be considered “necessary . . . only if there
were no alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less
inconsistent with it, which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to
achieve its health policy objectives”).
81. See EC – Tariff Preferences, supra note 67, at ¶¶ 7.176, 7.236, 8.1
(determining that the EC’s Drug Arrangements, which suspended the Generalized
System of Preferences (“GSP”), were inconsistent with GATT because they did
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Asbestos, where they inquired whether there was an alternative
policy that would restrict trade less severely than an outright ban on
asbestos-containing products.82 However, unlike the Appellate Body
determination in EC – Asbestos, which found that the ban on
asbestos-containing fibers was necessary because there were no other
feasible alternative policies, the United States has other ways to
fulfill its health policy objectives.83 For example, the United States
could pass legislation that would place all flavored cigarettes in the
same regulatory framework.84 Additionally, the United States could
rescind the ban on flavored cigarettes and replace it with a tax that
would apply to all flavored cigarettes, including menthol cigarettes.85
Besides taxation-based solutions, the United States could enact
legislation that would include menthol cigarettes in the ban on all
flavored cigarettes.86 Any of these alternative solutions would fulfill
the health policy goals of the Act without violating GATT’s
nondiscrimination obligations.87
The United States claims that a scientific report mandated by the
Act will aid in determining how menthol cigarettes will be regulated
in the future.88 Specifically, section 907(e) of the Act mandates the
creation of a report that will study the “impact of the use of menthol
not apply equally to all countries).
82. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 174 (concluding that there was no
viable alternative to a blanket ban on products containing asbestos that could
achieve the desired health objective of reducing exposure to carcinogens).
83. See id.; see also discussion infra Part IV (discussing potential legislative
solutions).
84. See discussion infra Part IV (describing four potential GATT-consistent
legislative solutions that would, to varying degrees, fulfill the Act’s policy goals).
85. See id. (discussing taxation and other possible regulatory solutions that are
GATT-consistent and that would fulfill the policy goals of the Act).
86. Such a solution could entail deleting the legislative exception for menthol
cigarettes in Section 907(a)(1)(A) of the FDCA. See Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act, §§ 101, 907(a)(1)(A) (amending the FDCA to include
provisions of the Act and exempting menthol cigarettes from the flavored cigarette
ban).
87. See id. § 2 (observing that youth smoking is a serious public health
problem); see also GATT, supra note 12, art. XX (requiring that any policy used to
protect human health not discriminate against foreign goods).
88. See Jonathan Lynn, US Rejects Panel on Clove Cigarette Ban, REUTERS,
June 22, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE65
L1O920100622 (citing a U.S. official who argued that a request for a Panel ruling
was premature because the legislation calls for a scientific Panel to investigate and
issue a report on the effects of menthol cigarettes by March 2011).
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in cigarettes on the public health, including such use among children,
African-Americans, Latinos, and other racial and ethnic minorities,”
before taking further action.89 If the United States plans to defend the
section 907(e) policy on the grounds that it is necessary to protect
human health and that it is based on sound scientific evidence, it will
fall short for two reasons. First, the argument likely fails because it
does not convincingly explain why the policy must violate GATT
Article III:4 by discriminating against all non-menthol flavored
cigarettes.90 Second, the reliance on the particular scientific study
mandated by section 907(e) is unlikely to convince the Panel that the
ban is necessary. The Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos addressed the
role of scientific evidence in determining policies “necessary” to
protect health.91 The Appellate Body stated: “A [m]ember is not
obliged, in setting health policy, automatically to follow what, at a
given time, may constitute a majority scientific opinion.”92 EC –
Asbestos best explained the treatment of scientific evidence by
stating that “‘responsible and representative governments may act in
good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may be a divergent
opinion coming from qualified and respected sources.’”93 The United
States seems to argue that, by mandating a scientific study on the
health effects of menthol cigarettes, it is performing needed scientific
assessments before considering further legislation that would place
restrictions on menthol cigarettes.94 This argument provides weak
justification for treating menthol differently. Current scientific
89. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 908(e).
90. See id.; GATT, supra note 12, art. III:4 (declaring that foreign products
must be given treatment “no less favourable” than that given to similar domestic
products).
91. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 167 (discussing the scientific evidence
regarding whether exposure to asbestos-containing cement products was harmful
to human health).
92. See id. ¶¶ 29, 178 (concluding that a Panel does not need to reach a
decision based on the preponderance of the evidence standard when reaching a
decision on an Article XX(b) issue).
93. See id. ¶¶ 177-81 (quoting Appellate Body Report, European Communities
– Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 194,
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, (Feb. 13, 1998)) (holding that where France
relied in good faith on scientific evidence showing that certain asbestos-containing
products were harmful to human health, that scientific evidence was a legitimate
basis for its policy decision).
94. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907(e)
(calling for the scientific study on menthol cigarettes).
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literature, including extensive research released by the U.S. Surgeon
General, overwhelmingly and uniformly supports the conclusion that
all cigarettes, including menthol cigarettes, are harmful to human
health.95 It is therefore highly dubious that the United States can offer
this argument in good faith as required by the clear interpretation
given by the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos.
3. The Ban on Clove Cigarettes Violates the Chapeau of Article XX
Because It Discriminates Against Indonesian Imports of Clove
Cigarettes.
If Indonesia proves that, under subparagraph (b), the U.S. ban is
not necessary to protect human health, the analysis ends and the U.S.
would be found in violation of its WTO obligations.96 However, even
if the United States succeeds in convincing the Panel that the ban is
necessary, the ban would still fail under the requirements of the
chapeau.97 The chapeau prohibits measures that constitute arbitrary
and unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail and are a hidden restriction on international
trade.98 GATT’s negotiators constructed the chapeau with the goal of
preventing abuse of the Article XX exceptions.99 According to the
Appellate Body in U.S. – Shrimp, three constituent elements must be

95. See 29 Surgeon General’s Reports, supra note 71 (listing and surveying
Surgeon Generals’ Reports from 1964 through 2006 addressing the impact of
smoking on health, all of which conclude that all cigarettes have deleterious health
effects); see also About the Office of the Surgeon General, OFFICE OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL, http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/about/index.html (last visited
Nov. 4, 2010) (stating the mission of the Surgeon General is to “provid[e]
Americans [with] the best scientific information available on how to improve their
health and reduce the risk of illness and injury”).
96. See U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 19, at 22-23 (explaining that an Article XX
analysis is a “two-tiered” test because it is subject to the particular exceptions
listed in Article XX(a)-(j) and to the introductory requirements of Article XX’s
chapeau).
97. Id.
98. See id. at 22-24 (clarifying that the chapeau is to be applied reasonably
with regard to the particular exceptions of Article XX, and construed broadly to
avoid arbitrary or discriminatory trade violations, unless one of the listed
exceptions applies).
99. See U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 15, ¶ 157 (noting that pursuant to the
negotiation history of the chapeau, the Article XX exceptions should be applied in
a “limited and conditional” manner).
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present before a policy violates the chapeau:100 (1) the applied
measure must be discriminatory;101 (2) the discrimination must be
arbitrary or unjustifiable;102 and (3) the discrimination must be found
between countries where “the same conditions prevail.”103
The U.S. ban meets all three elements of this test and thus violates
the Article XX chapeau. When considering the first two elements of
the test, the Panel should find that the U.S. ban on clove cigarettes is
discriminatory because it is “arbitrary or unjustifiable.”104 In EC –
Asbestos, the Panel Report observed that in order to find a policy
arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminatory, the Panel must examine the
manner in which a member applies the questioned policy.105 Here,
the Panel found that a French ban on all white asbestos, including
those produced domestically, did not violate the chapeau because it
did not unfairly or unjustifiably discriminate against imported
asbestos.106 In U.S. – Gasoline, the Appellate Body found that a U.S.
policy of regulating imported gasoline differently than domestic
gasoline was unjustifiable under the chapeau partly because the
United States did not consider the cost of its policies on other

100. See id. ¶ 150 (stating that these elements underlie the concept of “arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail” as stated in the chapeau).
101. See id. ¶ 176 (deciding that the application of U.S. law to various countries
that export shrimp was discriminatory, and finding that discrimination is an
element in determining whether a country’s policy violates the chapeau).
102. See id. ¶ 184 (finding that a U.S. certification process for applicant
countries seeking to meet U.S. standards for shrimp imports was discriminatory in
that it was both “arbitrary” and “unjustifiable,” causing the Appellate Body to hold
that the certification policy violated the chapeau).
103. See GATT, supra note 12, art. XX; U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 15, ¶ 184
(finding that arbitrary discrimination occurred in countries with like conditions
where shrimp caught using methods acceptable to U.S. regulations were banned
from the U.S. because they were caught in the waters of countries that were not
certified by the U.S.); U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 19, at 23-24 (finding that the
standard of “where the same conditions prevail” applies to both conditions in
importing and exporting countries, as well as conditions found only in exporting
countries).
104. GATT, supra note 12, art. XX.
105. See EC – Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 67, ¶ 8.226.
106. Id. ¶¶ 2.3-2.5, 8.222-8.224 (noting that the French ban was applied equally
to like exports and domestic products, and that the ban was intended to protect
workers and consumers from the hazardous health effects associated with
asbestos).

2011]

LOSING FLAVOR

537

countries.107
The present case can be distinguished from EC – Asbestos because
the ban on flavored cigarettes singles out nations that are large
exporters of clove cigarettes and leaves U.S. menthol producers with
a monopoly on legally-available flavored cigarettes.108 In this respect,
the U.S. ban is similar to actions that prompted the Venezuelan
complaint in U.S. – Gasoline.109 In the present case, there is little
evidence that the U.S. Congress substantively considered the trade
implications of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act.110 The Indonesian economy feels the impact of the U.S. ban on
clove cigarettes much more acutely than the U.S. economy because
“the [U.S.] does not produce clove cigarettes, whereas ninety-nine
percent of the clove cigarettes imported by the [U.S.] come from
Indonesia.”111
107. See U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 19, at 28-29 (finding that the U.S.
discrimination against imported gasoline was unjustifiable because it “must have
been foreseen” and was likely avoidable). The Panel held that the nature of
discrimination under the chapeau of Article XX was different than that needed
under Article III:4, and noted that the U.S. policy went “beyond what was
necessary for the Panel to determine that a violation of Article III:4 had occurred in
the first place.” See id.
108. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907(a)
(banning all flavored cigarettes except for menthol flavored cigarettes); EC –
Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 2 (noting that France’s ban on asbestos products was a
blanket ban, prohibiting use of asbestos from manufacture to sales in the French
domestic marketplace).
109. See U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 19, at 28-29 (finding that the U.S. failed to
account for the cost to refiners in importing countries by not cooperating with
foreign governments to help mitigate the impact of imposing statutory baselines
under the U.S. Gasoline Rule).
110. See 155 CONG. REC. E912-13 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2009) (accounting for
what was the only statement in the Congressional Record during debate on the bill
that raised the potential implications of the Act on the U.S.-Indonesia trade
relationship).
111. See 155 CONG. REC. E913-14 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2009) (Letter from Mari
Elka Pagestu, Minister of Trade, Republic of Indonesia, to Ambassador Susan
Schwab, United States Trade Representative) (contrasting the fact that the U.S.
does not produce clove cigarettes with the fact that menthol cigarettes are produced
“almost exclusively” in the U.S. and highlighting the fact that clove cigarettes
accounted for only 0.1% of the total U.S. cigarette market); see also Mark Drajem
& Lorraine Woellert, Clove Cigarettes May Prompt U.S., Indonesia Dispute
(Update 1), BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=21070001&sid= a9YjoELUY1jU (stating that about one-fifth of
Indonesia’s $500 million per year export value of clove cigarettes were imported to
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The third element is satisfied because the ban applies to all
cigarettes, except menthol, regardless of where they were
manufactured.112 U.S. – Gasoline clarifies that the discrimination
may refer to differences in the conditions imposed on an exporting
country versus an importing country, as well as to differences in
conditions between various exporting countries.113 In the present
case, U.S. firms may manufacture and sell menthol cigarettes in the
United States, but Indonesia cannot export clove cigarettes to the
United States.114 Therefore, due to the structure and impact of the
U.S. ban on flavored cigarettes, it violates the chapeau because it is
unjustifiably discriminatory between countries where the same
conditions prevail.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Presuming the Panel will find the United States in violation of its
trade obligations under GATT, Congress will likely be compelled to
pass legislation that ends the discrimination against Indonesianproduced clove cigarettes. Congress can enact four policies that
would bring the United States into compliance with GATT while still
retaining the policy goals of the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act.
First, Congress can legislate the ban to apply equally across all
flavored-cigarette categories. A blanket ban on all flavored cigarettes
would ensure that all flavored cigarettes, regardless of where they
were manufactured, would be consistent with the nondiscrimination
principles of Article III:4.115 This solution is the simplest and most
effective way to create a public policy that keeps children from
smoking flavored cigarettes.116 If the legislative history of the Family
the United States).
112. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, §§ 101, 907.
113. See U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 19, 23-24 (stating that the assumption that
the chapeau applies to both importing and exporting countries was a “common
understanding” between the parties).
114. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, §§ 101, 901,
907(a)(1)(A) (expanding the authority of the FDA to regulate tobacco-based
products, but excepting menthol under a special provisionary rule).
115. GATT, supra note 12, art. III:4.
116. See Press Release, David T. Tayloe, Jr., President, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics,
Press Statement on FDA Ban on Flavored Cigarettes a Strong First Step Under
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Sept. 23, 2009) (arguing
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Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act is an indication, any
further legislation seeking to ban all flavored cigarettes, including
menthol, will likely face political challenges that will limit any
prospects for enactment.117 The U.S. domestic cigarette industry and
other interested groups lobbied vigorously for the menthol
exception.118 Thus, it is doubtful whether the political capital
necessary to legislate such a ban in the near future exists.
Second, Congress can create other regulatory tools that can
potentially realize the policy goal of reducing youth smoking. Such
regulations could include any combination of the following policies,
as long as the United States implements them consistently across all
types of flavored cigarettes: taxation, packaging guidelines, or
educational programs. The United States often employs punitive
taxation as a disincentive for smokers, but its effectiveness on
consumer behavior is questionable.119 Alternatively, warning labels
specific to flavored cigarettes may have an effect on consumer
behavior.120 Finally, there is evidence that comprehensive programs
that ”the strongest possible tobacco regulation is necessary to protect [America’s]
children and adolescents”).
117. See Associated Press, Committee OKs Tobacco Rules Critics Question
Cooperation from Philip Morris, AUGUSTA CHRON., Aug. 2, 2007, at A10 (noting
that the Act was the product of several years of negotiations between Senators,
“health groups,” and “tobacco giant Philip Morris,” and recognizing that the
legislation passed despite concerns from representatives of tobacco producing
states that the Act would increase Philip Morris’ already dominant market share).
118. See Alicia Mundy & Lauren Etter, Senate Passes FDA Tobacco Bill, WALL
ST. J., June 12, 2009, at B5 (reporting that, since 1998, the cigarette industry has
paid out $308 million lobbying against the Act and that the Congressional Black
Caucus pushed for the menthol exception because “[a]bout 75% of AfricanAmerican smokers buy menthol brands”).
119. See, e.g., The Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111–3, § 701, 123 Stat. 8, 99–101 (codified at I.R.C. § 5701(a)–
(g) (Supp. III 2009)) (increasing federal cigarette taxes); Bruce Kennedy, Tobacco
Taxes Grow Globally, But Do They Really Work?, DAILY FINANCE (July 8, 2010,
11:00
AM),
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/taxes/global-tobaccotaxes/19545924/ (citing the comments of Randal Kuhn, Director of the Global
Health Affairs Program at the University of Denver, regarding the influence that
higher cigarette taxes have on smoker behavior and reporting that smokers tend to
buy cheaper brands when prices rise rather than stop smoking altogether).
Additionally, any taxation of cigarettes must comply with the requirements of
GATT Article III:2 on the application of internal taxation measures on foreign
products. GATT, supra note 12, art. III:2.
120. See David Hammond et al., Text and Graphic Warnings on Cigarette
Packages: Findings from the International Tobacco Control Four Country Study,
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aimed at curtailing youth smoking can be effective.121 Such steps, if
implemented evenly across all types of flavored cigarettes, are
compliant with Article III:4.
Third, the United States can treat all flavored cigarettes equally by
placing a temporary moratorium on the sale of all flavored cigarettes
pending the result of a congressionally mandated scientific study.
This policy would be similar to the study on menthol cigarettes
mandated by section 907(e) of the Act.122 If the study includes other
flavored cigarettes, and if it is consistent with other scientific, peerreviewed literature on the unique dangers of flavored cigarettes, then
it may provide Congress with enough political cover to pass a
blanket ban on all flavored cigarettes. The most glaring shortcoming
of this recommendation is that it temporarily leaves flavored
cigarettes on the market contrary to the intent of the original Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act.
Finally, Congress can institute a temporary ban on menthol
cigarettes that would “sunset” after the conclusion of the scientific
report.123 After a temporary ban sunsets, Congress can choose to
extend or eliminate it entirely.124 However, the cigarette industry
groups that advocated for the menthol exception in the Act would
likely oppose such a measure.125 A sunset provision may serve as a
32 AM. J. OF PREVENTIVE MED. 202, 202 (2007) (comparing the “size, position, and
design” of warning labels on cigarette packages in the United States, United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and finding that large, visible warnings have a
high correlation with increased effectiveness).
121. See, e.g., Melanie Wakefield & Frank Chaloupka, Effectiveness of
Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programmes in Reducing Teenage Smoking in
the USA, 9 TOBACCO CONTROL 177, 184 (2000) (concluding that there is evidence
that comprehensive tobacco control programs can alter the factors that influence
teenage smoking, ultimately reducing the number of teens who smoke).
122. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907(e); see
discussion supra Part II(A) (discussing the § 907(e) requirement that the FDA
Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee study “the impact of the use of
menthol in cigarettes on the public health” with particular focus on minorities).
123. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a sunset law
as “a statute under which a governmental agency or program automatically
terminates at the end of a fixed period unless it is formally renewed”).
124. See generally VIRGINIA A MCMURTY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22181,
A SUNSET COMMISSION FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CRS-1 (July 21, 2006) (stating that the sunset legislative concept allows for
programs to expire automatically unless expressly renewed).
125. See C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH
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vehicle to bring the United States into compliance with its WTO
obligations, while also providing legislative cover to politicians
adverse to an outright departure from the Act.126

CONCLUSION
The U.S. ban on flavored cigarettes violates its WTO obligations.
Under an Article III:4 analysis, clove and menthol cigarettes are
“like products” because they are in a competitive relationship, share
the same end-use and are used by consumers to fulfill that end-use,
have almost identical tariff classifications, and are physically
similar.127 The United States discriminates against Indonesianproduced clove cigarettes because it allows for the sale and
manufacture of domestically produced menthol cigarettes while
banning the sale of clove cigarettes. Furthermore, the United States
cannot rely on an Article XX(b) exception because, while the
flavored cigarette ban was designed to protect human health, the
policy is unnecessarily discriminatory and violates the chapeau of
Article XX.128 Though there are numerous ways that the United
States can change its current policy, the political feasibility of these
options remains uncertain.

SERV., R40475, FDA TOBACCO REGULATION: THE FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION
AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT 3-4 (May 28, 2009) (noting that the decision to
exempt menthol cigarettes was widely viewed as a compromise between
congressional leaders and lobbyists for Phillip Morris in order to secure the
company’s support for the Act and that tobacco companies generally oppose
giving the FDA “unfettered authority” to regulate their products); Lobbying
Tobacco Industry Profile, 2009, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?lname=A02&year=2009
(showing that in 2009, the tobacco industry spent $24 million on 175 lobbyists,
137 of whom were former government officials, to influence federal legislation
and regulations).
126. See Chris Mooney, A Short History of Sunsets, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 4,
2004, at 67, available at http://www.legalaffairs. org/issues/January-February2004/story_mooney_janfeb04.msp (maintaining that sunset provisions can buy
politicians time to deal with controversial issues in the short term, but will create
pressure for those politicians when they expire, as the politicians will be forced to
make decisions).
127. See discussion supra Part III(A)(1) (describing the elements needed to
determine whether products are considered “like products” under Article III:4).
128. See discussion supra Part III(B)(2) (finding that other nondiscriminatory
policy options exist for the United States).

